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Modeling driver control behavior in both routine and near-accident driving
Gustav Markkula
Volvo Group Trucks Technology, Advanced Technology and Research, Göteborg, Sweden
Department of Applied Mechanics, Chalmers University of Technology, Göteborg, Sweden
Building on ideas from contemporary neuroscience, a framework is proposed in which drivers’ steering and
pedal behavior is modeled as a series of individual control adjustments, triggered after accumulation of
sensory evidence for the need of an adjustment, or evidence that a previous or ongoing adjustment is not
achieving the intended results. Example simulations are provided. Specifically, it is shown that evidence
accumulation can account for previously unexplained variance in looming detection thresholds and brake
onset timing. It is argued that the proposed framework resolves a discrepancy in the current driver modeling
literature, by explaining not only the short-latency, well-tuned, closed-loop type of control of routine driving,
but also the degradation into long-latency, ill-tuned open-loop control in more rare, unexpected, and urgent
situations such as near-accidents.
INTRODUCTION
There is a wealth of existing models that describe the
steering and pedal behavior exhibited by drivers to con-
trol their vehicles (Plöchl & Edelmann, 2007; Markkula et
al., 2012). Such models can provide great advantages in
many simulation-based approaches to the study of traffic,
not the least concerning road safety (van Auken et al., 2011;
Markkula et al., 2012). However, as will be described here
in a brief literature review, driver models have so far taken
rather different forms when accounting for routine driving
behavior on the one hand, and near-accident behavior on
the other. To date, there have been no models that predict
the differing characteristics of control behavior in these two
contexts, based on a single set of underlying assumptions.
The aim of this paper is to present a framework which could
be capable of doing so, partially with the help of some re-
cent results from the neurobiological study of sensorimotor
behavior. The argument for the proposed assumptions will
be based on explanations of how the resulting framework is
capable of predicting typical properties of both routine and
near-accident behavior, complemented with reconsideration
of some existing results from the driver behavior literature.
REVIEW
Most models of routine driving (Plöchl & Edelmann,
2007) assume that drivers engage in closed-loop control,
continuously updating steering and pedals in response to the
traffic situation, limited only by a constant neuromuscular
delay of about 0.2 seconds. In contrast, typical models of
near-accident control (van Auken et al., 2011; Kusano &
Gabler, 2012) posit single open-loop braking or steering ma-
neuvers of a shape that many closed-loop models have a hard
time reproducing (Markkula et al., submitted), occurring af-
ter a long reaction time of about 1-2 seconds. Near-accident
maneuver amplitudes have been modeled as basically ran-
dom, with reports of both overreactions (Malaterre et al.,
1988) and under-utilization of vehicle capabilities (Adams,
1994), whereas in routine driving, control has been assumed
to be well-tuned to vehicle and situation dynamics, some-
times to the point of optimal control. Many routine driving
models posit the use of perceptual cues, such as the move-
ment of sight points for lateral control (Salvucci & Gray,
2004), or, for longitudinal control, the optical size q and ex-
pansion q˙ of a forward obstacle, the optically defined esti-
mate of time to collision t = q=q˙ (Lee, 1976; Flach et al.,
2011) or its inverse 1=t (Kiefer et al., 2003). When such
cues have been considered in near-accident control, it has
been to discuss detection thresholds, the minimal stimuli at
all discernible to a driver (Maddox & Kiefer, 2012). On the
other hand, if thresholds have been applied in modeling of
routine driving, it has mainly been to account for the satis-
ficing nature of non-critical control: To limit expended ef-
fort, drivers postpone control until conflict-describing cues
get large enough (Kiefer et al., 2003; Gordon & Magnuski,
2006; Flach et al., 2011), reaching levels orders of magnitude
above typical thresholds for detection.
Considering the above, one could posit two distinct
classes of behavior, mediated by different neural circuitry
altogether. However, there are clear difficulties to this ap-
proach: Isn’t there a continuum of traffic situations between
“routine” and “near-accident”? And from where does the,
albeit limited, near-accident ability of handling pedals and
steering wheel come, if not from routine driving experience?
NEW CONTRIBUTION
Driving control as a series of open-loop adjustments
The first key assumption of the proposed framework is
that, at a basic level, driving control is to a large extent
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Figure 1. Example steering and pedal use in routine and near-accident situations, all from heavy truck driving in real traffic.
constructed from individual, discrete control adjustments,
each of which is open-loop in the sense that the shape of
the adjustment over time is predetermined already at its on-
set. Fig. 1 provides examples, from a data set of natural-
istic driving, of human driving control in both routine and
near-accident maneuvering. The lower row of panels show
rates of change of pedal and steering wheel positions. These
rates stay close to zero throughout, except for intermittent
upward or downward pulses of activity (highlighted with ver-
tical gray lines), interpretable as the hypothesized individ-
ual control adjustments. Previously, it has been observed
that amplitude and maximum steering rate of severe evasive
maneuvers are linearly correlated (Breuer, 1998; Markkula
et al., submitted), suggesting a constant maneuver duration.
Recently, Benderius and Markkula (2014) have shown that
this correlation exists also for routine steering adjustments.
These were found to follow bell-shaped profiles of move-
ment speed, similar to what is consistently observed in labo-
ratory experiments on reaching (Franklin & Wolpert, 2011).
Short bell-shaped bursts of movement have been suggested
to serve as spinal-level building blocks that can be com-
bined and superpositioned to construct complex movement
(Giszter, 2009).
It is proposed, here, that driving control adjustments are
typically both small and frequent in occurrence, explaining
why routine driving can nevertheless be well characterized as
a continuous closed-loop activity. This would be especially
true in situations like curve-taking (see the third panel from
the left in Fig. 1, from about 20 s), where overall control is
large in duration and amplitude, compared to the individual
adjustments. However, in more urgent situations, where large
changes in pedal or steering command are needed quickly,
the underlying open-loop nature of control comes to the fore.
Additionally, when specific sequences of movement
bursts are used recurrently, these can be established as
higher-level movement primitives in their own right (Giszter,
2009). Such learning could be hypothesized for longer-
duration control maneuvers that are recurrently useful in traf-
fic, such as gradual changes in pedal position (visible for the
throttle at 5 and 15 s in the leftmost panel of Fig. 1), inter-
section turning, or lane changes, which human drivers can
perform blindfolded with some, but not complete, accuracy
(Cloete & Wallis, 2009).
Some previous models of driving have considered in-
termittent control, occurring either at satisficing thresholds
(Gordon & Magnuski, 2006) or as a result of bottlenecks
in information processing (Bi et al., 2012). Here, another
means of accounting for adjustment timing is adopted.
Timing distributions from noisy evidence accumulation
The second key assumption is that one needs to consider
distributions of control timing, not only in near-accident con-
trol, but also in routine driving, and that these distributions
are affected by, among other things, situation kinematics and
expectancy. Specifically, it is suggested here that (a) late tim-
ing of control in unexpected critical situations and (b) satis-
ficing timing of control in non-critical routine situations, are
governed by the same underlying mechanisms.
A strong candidate for such a mechanism is available from
accumulator models of action timing. These models, which
assume that action occurs after integration to threshold of
sensory evidence for an action’s suitability, have been shown
to account well for timing distributions in a large number
of laboratory tasks, and through microelectrode recordings
in behaving animals, likely neural correlates of this pro-
cess have been identified (Purcell et al., 2010). Recently,
Ratcliff and Strayer (2013) have successfully fitted this type
of model to distributions of reaction time to one important
fixed-intensity stimulus in traffic: brake lights.
In order to account for the satisficing patterns of behavior
in routine driving, one would need to consider also variable-
intensity stimuli, such as the perceptual cues used in many
driver models. As a first indication that driver response tim-
ing can be understood as accumulation of such perceptual
evidence, consider the experiment reported by Lamble et al.
(1999), on how detection thresholds for optical expansion
rate q˙ vary with gaze eccentricity and initial lead vehicle
headway: Test subjects, instructed to decelerate as soon as
they detected a closing headway, consistently did so at lower
q˙ values for longer initial headways. This is precisely what
would be predicted by an accumulator model where q˙ is con-
sidered the stimulus intensity, since integration of a small
quantity over a long time is equivalent to integration of a
large quantity over a short time. To see this in more detail,
consider the following simple accumulator:
dA(t)
dt
=C P(t) M+ e(t) (1)
Where P(t) is a stimulus,C andM are model parameters, and
e(t) is noise, and where detection occurs when A(t)  A0.
This specific formulation is inspired by Purcell et al. (2010).
In line with their interpretation of A as a neuron firing rate,
this quantity is constrained to A(t) 0.
The upper panels of Fig. 2 illustrate the behavior of this
model, with P(t) = q˙(t), C = 1, and zero noise, parameter-
fitted (M = 0:000554 rad/s; A0 = 0:00143 rad) to reproduce
the detection thresholds reported by Lamble et al. (1999)
for zero gaze eccentricity. With a longer initial headway,
q˙ grows more slowly, meaning that A will reach threshold
later in time, but at a lower final q˙ value, just as observed in
the experiment. The lower panels of Fig. 2 hint at how the
same model could also account for the observed increasing
thresholds and variance with increasing gaze eccentricity, by
including a non-zero noise term e(t), and makingC a nonlin-
ear function of eccentricity (not pursued further here).
The experiment of Lamble et al. (1999) was not intended
to approximate satisficing driver behavior. For a step in
that direction, consider the results reported by Kiefer et
al. (2003). These authors instructed drivers to wait to the
last second deemed possible before applying “normal” or
“hard” braking, in response to a set of test track scenarios
with a lead vehicle mockup. This is also a rather artificial
task, but arguably at least the normal braking condition could
come somewhere close to routine, satisficing headway con-
trol. It is interesting to note, then, that the observed pat-
tern of inverse times to collision (TTC) at response, in the
normal-braking scenarios with lead vehicle deceleration, can
be well explained (R2 = 0:91) by an accumulator model with
P(t) = q˙(t)=q(t) = 1=t(t); see Fig. 3 (M = 0:00155 s 1;
A0 = 0:0888). For the scenarios without deceleration, on the
other hand, the same model predicts a much earlier response
than what was observed. This could mean that there is some
fundamental flaw to the accumulator approach, but it could
also be that the drivers were using some other perceptual cue
than just 1=t, or that the “last-second normal braking” task
was further from routine driving behavior in the scenarios
without deceleration.
In any case, in real traffic, driver behavior is not based
solely on responding to graded perceptual quantities such as
1=t. Fig. 4 provides an illustration of how Eq. (1) can be un-
derstood in this broader context. For example, braking may
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Figure 2. The 20 m and 40 m headway scenarios of Lamble
et al. (1999). Top left: Growth of q˙ over time. Top right: Ac-
cumulator model fitted to detection thresholds observed for
zero gaze eccentricity, and illustration of model with noise
(light blue trajectories and detection distribution). Bottom
left: Detection thresholds (mean and standard deviation) as
a function of gaze eccentricity, as observed by Lamble et al.
Bottom right: Prediction from model with noise, at values of
C selected to roughly match the data in the left panel.
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Figure 3. Accumulator model fit of “normal” last-second
braking onset data from Kiefer et al. (2003), for decelerating
and stationary lead vehicle scenarios (own speed in mph/lead
vehicle speed in mph/lead vehicle deceleration in g).
be triggered without optical expansion, based on other evi-
dence for its need, such as a brake light onset, or a red traffic
light ahead of the lead vehicle. Conversely, braking may not
occur despite optical expansion due to counter-evidence such
as the traffic light shifting to green, or the lead vehicle’s turn
indicator activating.
With Fig. 4 in mind, the perceptual quantity P(t) in Eq. (1)
can be interpreted as being one piece of evidence for a possi-
ble need of control adjustment, and the M term as being the
sum of a negative gating (corresponding to a minimum level
of input activation for accumulation to begin; again inspired
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Figure 4. Schematic illustration of the proposed accumulator
account of control adjustment timing.
by Purcell et al., 2010) together with all the other available
evidence for and against the control adjustment. If so, the pa-
rameter M should vary with expectancy: In situations where
the driver would normally not at all expect a need for a con-
trol adjustment, M will be larger, dA=dt will be smaller, the
driver will be correspondingly desensitized to the perceptual
quantity P, and the time to response will be prolonged.
Magnitude of adjustments tuned to sensory inputs
Another important assumption, which may not be surpris-
ing given what has been said so far, is that the magnitude of
each control adjustment is affected by the situation at hand.
Specifically, it is suggested here that in routine, steady state
driving, each control adjustment aims to resolve the situation
that triggered it. A steering adjustment caused by a moving
far point aims to immobilize the far point, a brake application
caused by a looming lead vehicle aims to stop the looming.
For often-encountered driving situations, drivers will have
had ample time to learn suitable mappings from sensory in-
put to control adjustment, acquiring a near-optimal trade-off
between effort and performance, and what can be interpreted
as a thorough understanding of their vehicle’s dynamics. See
(Markkula, 2013) for a sketch of how the far point control
law suggested by Salvucci and Gray (2004) could be un-
derstood in this way. However, in more critical situations,
typically previously unexperienced by the driver, the same
mappings may no longer be as well-tuned to the situation or
to the vehicle (Markkula et al., submitted), and this could
explain reports of driver overreactions or underreactions in
near-accident maneuvering. Furthermore, a possibly relevant
neurobiological phenomenon in this context is motor noise,
inherent variability in motor output which typically scales
with movement amplitude (Franklin & Wolpert, 2011), such
that large pedal or steering movements will be more likely to
turn out far from what was intended by the driver.
Forward-model prediction of sensory input
An important follow-up question to what has been said so
far is: When a control-adjusting burst of activity has been
generated, how long time must pass before the next one can
occur? To begin with, the previously cited work on motor
primitives (Giszter, 2009) as well as Fig. 1 suggest that one
does not have to await the completion of the first burst; con-
trol adjustments can be additively superpositioned. But if
each control adjustment aims to completely resolve the situ-
ation that triggered it, such as suggested above, then super-
position should not be needed. Rather, it would seem inap-
propriate to generate any further control until the vehicle has
fully responded, with its inherent delays, to the first adjust-
ment.
One possibility here is that the accumulator is simply re-
set to zero or some intermediate value after reaching thresh-
old, and that during the time after the first control adjust-
ment, when the original situation is still not fully resolved,
the delays of the accumulation process in itself is enough to
withhold further control response. A more elegant solution,
with neurobiological support, would be that when the mo-
tor command for the first control adjustment is generated, an
efference copy of this command is sent to parts of the brain
(especially the cerebellum), which are capable of generating
forward model predictions of the effect of the motor action
on future sensory input (Franklin &Wolpert, 2011). It is thus
proposed here that after each control adjustment, a prediction
Pp(t) is formed of how P(t) will respond, e.g. by gradually
falling to zero. Pp(t) is then included as an inhibitory input
to the accumulator, such that what is driving the accumulator
is actually not P(t), but P(t) Pp(t).
Fig. 5 illustrates the behavior of the brake reaction model
fitted to the Kiefer et al. (2003) data (Fig. 3), complemented
with (a) a linear mapping from 1=t at brake adjustment on-
set to adjustment amplitude, well-tuned for moderate levels
of lead vehicle braking, and (b) a simple forward model of
how 1=t will respond to such adjustments. Full details of
these simulations are beyond the scope here; they are shown
merely as a qualitative illustration of the proposed framework
principles. Specifically, it can be noted how an unusually
high lead vehicle deceleration causes an initial underreaction,
followed by increases in pedal position later on.
DISCUSSION
Many testable predictions can be made based on the
framework proposed here. For example, in both routine and
near-accident situations, control timing should be affected by
the dynamics of both traffic situation and evidence accumu-
lation, such as preliminarily suggested here for the Kiefer
et al. (2003) data set. To test this prediction in more detail,
controlled experiments are needed, where situation dynamics
are varied while keeping constant any other evidence to the
driver for or against the need of control adjustments.
If the suggested framework principles can be corrobo-
rated, they can be used for developing improved simula-
tion models of driver behavior. Near-accident models can
be extended with situation-dependent distributions for both
response time and maneuver amplitudes. Routine driving
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Figure 5. A braking model based on the proposed frame-
work, in two scenarios with lead vehicle deceleration.
models can be extended to better account for control, most
immediately in situations where longer-duration learned ma-
neuvers should be rare, such as keeping in a lane with low
curvature, or car-following at roughly constant speed.
It should be noted that several factors important for driv-
ing control have been left out of the scope here, such
as arousal, cognitive control, and sensorimotor learning
(Engström et al., 2013). However, the proposed framework
seems highly amenable to extensions in these directions,
probably more so than alternative frameworks based on for
example control theory.
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